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Adaptive Governance: The Role of Loyalty
Tomas B. Klos & Bart Nooteboom

SOM Theme B: Inter-Firm Coordination and Change
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the governance of vertical interrm
relations, i.e. relations between buyers and their suppliers on indus-
trial, intermediate-goods markets. Networks of interacting, adaptive buy-
ers and suppliers are viewed as complex adaptive systems (Holland and
Miller 1991), which leads to the use of computer simulations to explore
the strategies that boundedly rational, adaptive agents learn to use to
manage their relations with suppliers. Starting from a static transaction
cost economic perspective, the model is extended with allowance for loyal
behavior and for trust to build up, with network embeddedness of rela-
tions and with the possibility for the agents to adapt their governance to
changing circumstances and to the changing relation, rendering economic
organization path-dependent. The paper analyzes how relations develop
in time: actors making and breaking relations, on the basis of evaluations
of expected protability and loyalty. When allowance is made for adap-
tation of the relative weights attached to each of these criteria, the result
is that buyers adaptively shift the weight from protability to loyalty.
Keywords
transaction cost economics, loyalty, adaptation, agent-based simulation
1 Introduction
This paper looks at problems of economic organization, specically the gover-
nance of buyer-supplier relations on industrial, intermediate-goods markets.
The principal theoretical framework is transaction cost economics (TCE),
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which states that economic organization should be done from a comparative
institutional perspective. TCE is concerned with the organization of the in-
terface between successive stages of activity and maintains that the attributes
of the transaction involved should be matched with a governance structure in
a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way. The relevant at-
tributes of transactions are frequency, uncertainty and asset specicity and the
alternative governance structures are markets, hierarchies (Williamson 1975)
and some \intermediate modes of organization" (Williamson 1979, p. 234),
such as bilateral and trilateral governance (Williamson 1985).
1.1 Transaction cost economics
TCE's behavioral assumptions are that economic agents are boundedly ratio-
nal as well as potentially opportunistic. To the (generally large) extent that
there is uncertainty, all future contingencies can not be foreseen at the mo-
ment contracts are drawn up, whence those are necessarily incomplete. To the
extent, then, that non-redeployable or transaction-specic investments have
been made, an agent is locked-in to the transaction and contingencies can
arise that the partner may opportunistically exploit. Specically (following
Williamson 1979), holding uncertainty at an intermediate level, transactions
that are not supported by specic investments are most eciently organized
on the market which oers superior incentives and economies of scale. The
transactions are standardized, the relation is not independently valued and so
it does not require specialized governance. If investments of a mixed or highly
specic kind have been made, there is an incentive to see the contract through
to completion, lest the specic investments be lost. In this case, the cost of
designing a specialized governance structure can not be recovered if the trans-
action occurs only occasionally, in which case trilateral governance is favored.
In case of a recurrent transaction, a transaction-specic governance struc-
ture is worthwhile. The alternatives, then, are bilateral governance, where
the autonomy of the parties is maintained and unied governance, where the
transaction is removed from the market altogether and is instead organized
within the rm, subject to an authority relation.
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1.2 Criticism
Three criticisms of TCE underlie the approach in the current paper. First of
all, consider the assumption that agents can be opportunistic. Agents may be
boundedly rational, but they are not non-rational, so they may be assumed
to be able to foresee, with some accuracy, not just that a partner may be
opportunistic, but also when, under which circumstances or with what prob-
ability and to take this into account in their decisions about economic orga-
nization. Whether or not an agent opportunistically exploits circumstances
that arise, depends on its incentives and its propensity to be opportunis-
tic (Nooteboom 1996). Incentives depend on the situation at hand whereas
propensity (or inclination) is an agent's subjective characteristic that is in-
versely related to its loyalty. One may further assume that, on the basis
of past experiences, the agent's partner can assess this propensity as a sub-
jectively determined probability of loyal|non-opportunistic|behavior in the
future. To the extent that, in some situation, an agent was loyal in the past, it
may reasonably be trusted to be loyal again in similar situations in the future.
In Weisbuch et al.'s (1997) model, similarly, an agent's preference for trad-
ing with a certain supplier|representing the agent's trust that a protable
transaction will ensue|is updated using past prots in their mutual relation.
Secondly, Williamson's approach is essentially a static one whereas there
should be adaptation of the resulting economic organization to t changing
circumstances through time. This is related to the previous point: if trust
builds up over time (but also, for example, as partners learn from each other,
tacit knowledge is made explicit and partners mutually co-adapt their respec-
tive competences (cf. Nooteboom 1992, Peli and Nooteboom 1997)), ways of
action become feasible that would otherwise not have been feasible. As Marsh
observes, \trust allows interactions between agents where there may have been
no eective interaction possible before trust. Trust allows parties to acknowl-
edge that, whilst there is a risk in relationships with potentially malevolent
agents, some form of interaction may produce benets, where no interaction
at all may not" (1994, p. 94).
Furthermore, a relation should not be studied as a dyad, but as part of a
larger network of interacting agents, where reputation may feed the experi-
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ences of an agent's opportunistic behavior in other relations back to its current
partner and where a supplier's increased value as a result of learning from a
certain buyer may spill over to relations that the supplier has with the buyer's
competitors.
Such a network of interacting, adaptive buyers and suppliers is appropriately
regarded as a complex adaptive system (Holland and Miller 1991) and in this
paper, accordingly, studied by means of computer simulation. The next section
discusses the simulation model. Section 3 presents the computer simulation
experimental design and results and section 4 concludes.
2 The model
As explained above, the focus is on complex systems of adaptive agents. An
agent is adaptive if (1) the agent's actions in its environment (that consists,
partly, of other agents) can be assigned a value and (2) the agent behaves in
such a way as to improve this value over time (Holland and Miller 1991, p.
365). In the current version of the simulation model, the agent's actions are
limited to its choice of a potential partner to request a relation with and to
its acceptance or rejection of such requests from others. The agents can have
only one partner at a time: accepting a request from an agent other than the
current partner, therefore, includes breaking the current relation, which may
entail switching costs: the supplier makes investments and to the extent that
those are specic, the partner that breaks a relation has to compensate the
supplier. The degree in which investments are specic (to a buyer) depends
on the extent to which the product that the buyer sells on the nal market is
dierentiated, measured on a scale from 0 to 1.
The buyers in the model sell products that incorporate inputs from suppliers.
Dierentiation yields a higher prot margin but also increases the specicity
of the assets required to produce the inputs. The buyer thus contributes
his position on the nal market to the prot that can be made through the
relation. The supplier contributes eciency of production, which, for now,
like the buyers' products' dierentiation, is given exogenously. The prot in a
relation is assumed to be shared equally among the partners.
The agents make their decisions on the basis of expected prots. A (po-
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tential) partner is given a `score' on the basis of the prot that the agent
expects to make in a relation with that partner. This expected prot is the
product of the prot that can potentially be made and the probability that
this potential will actually be realized. Potential prot (per product traded)














f0; 0:5; 1g. Potential prot is normalized, by dividing it by the maximum po-
tential prot, i.e. the prot that would be obtained in a relation with an `ideal'
partner. The probability that this potential prot will actually be realized in a
relation with the appropriate partner, is the agent's subjective interpretation
of the partner's loyalty (or the extent to which the agent trusts the partner),
which is adapted over time according to the agent's experiences in their mutual
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which is the `prot-elasticity of score' that represents the weight (or the im-
portance) that the agent|in determining scores|attaches to dierences in
prot between (potential) partners. Varying the exponential weights of prot
and loyalty can thus be thought of as reecting dierential preferences for risks
and returns.
An adaptive agent's behavior to improve the value of its actions over time,







), which can take on the values 0, 0.5 and 1. Each of these values is
attached a `strength' that the agent updates according to the performance it
obtains when using that particular value for 
1
. The strengths add up to 1
and updating of any given value's strength is done by rst multiplying it by
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the ratio of the prot the agent made in the relation it was deciding upon when
using the value to the prot the agent expected to make in that relation and
by subsequently renormalizing the three strengths. In each decision where the
agent needs to assess certain (potential) partners' scores, it randomly chooses
a value for 
1
with selection probabilities equal to the values' strengths. This
increases the selection probability of the value that allows the agent to perform
well, which is exactly what an adaptive agent is supposed to do.
3 Simulation design and results
Before the adaptive agent simulations, a benchmark study was performed in
which a series of simulations was run under a variety of distributions of dif-
ferentiation, eciency and values for 
1
, i.e. with non-adaptive strategies for
governance. The full experimental design is shown in Table 1. Some of those
results will be discussed before moving on to the results with adaptive agents.
In all experiments, there were 9 buyers and 9 suppliers. The buyers were evenly
distributed over 3 market `segments' which vary in their degree of dierenti-
ation and the suppliers over 3 eciency `groups'. The 3 columns under `dif-
ferentiation' and `eciency' give values for each of the three segments/groups
whereas the 3 columns under `loyalty weight per segment/group' give values
for 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for each of the three agents within each segment/group. The results
that will be presented are the buyers' normalized prots, i.e. their actual prof-
its divided by the maximum potential prots they would make if they always
satised their demand with optimal partner contribution.
The results for the buyers in the rst 4 experiments are like those in the rst
experiment (see Figure 1); the results in experiments 2 and 3 are even identical,
as are the results in experiments 1 and 4. Essentially, all the buyers perform
equally well and the fact that the suppliers use dierent `strategies' has no
eect. In Figure 1, there happen to be 2 buyers that do slightly worse than
the rest, but this is due to random factors: they just take a longer time before
they nd a supplier that accepts their request to enter into a relation with
them. All the buyers are equally attractive to the suppliers, so suppliers that
have a relation are not willing to switch from their current partner (specic




no. Dierentiation weight Eciency weight
per segment per `group'
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1
4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1
5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
6 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
7 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1
8 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1
9 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
10 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
11 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
12 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
13 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
14 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
15 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
16 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0.5 1
Table 1: First experimental design.





1 + 1 + di
b
=
1 + 0:5 + 0:5
1 + 1 + 0:5
= 0:8:
The numerator is the buyers' potential prot and the denominator is their
maximum potential prot; both are the same for all buyers, since all buyers'
products' dierentiation as well as all suppliers' eciency is 0.5.
The 4 experiments in the second set are also generally the same. As an
indication, Figure 2 shows the results in experiment 5.
Because the buyers dier in attractiveness, there is some switching initially.
Eventually, there are three levels at which the buyer's prots stabilize. Given
that all suppliers' eciency is 0.5, normalized potential prots for the buyers
as a function of the dierentiation of their prots,
1 + 0:5 + di
b
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Figure 2: Buyers' prot in experiment 5.
is 0.75, 0.8 and 0.833 for di
b
= 0, 0.5 and 1, respectively. Again, there are
no eects of the suppliers using dierent strategies. If there are dierences
between buyers in the same segment, there is slight indication that buyers
using lower weights for loyalty do a little worse in the long run, because they
have a harder time nding a supplier quickly. This eect is stronger in the
low-dierentiation segment than in the high-dierentiation segment, where all
buyers consistently do very well: the buyers in the low-dierentiation appar-
ently can not aord not to care about their partner's loyalty.
The real dierences between buyers' prots appear if there are dierences
between suppliers in terms of their eciency of production, as in the nal 8
experiments, in the rst 4 of which the buyers are also positioned in dierent
segments. To illustrate, Figure 3 shows the buyers' normalized performance
in experiment 9.







0 50 100 150 200
Figure 3: Buyers' prot in experiment 9.
teaming up with more (less) attractive suppliers: because, eventually, the most
(least) attractive buyers end up with the most (least) attractive suppliers, the
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= 0, 0.5 and 1, respectively. Less attractive
buyers take progressively longer to nd a suitable partner. Their requests
have to be rejected by very attractive suppliers fairly often before those highly
ecient suppliers' scores to them become so low that less ecient suppliers
become interesting. The least attractive buyers additionally have to be turned
down by the moderately ecient suppliers, before they `realize' that they have
to settle for the least attractive suppliers. An interesting observation is that
one of the least attractive buyers|being the lucky one to have the rst choice
of supplier|manages to team up with a highly ecient supplier that, of course,
quickly switches to a more attractive buyer as soon as one comes along.
In experiment 10 there is a strong eect of the buyers using dierent values
for 
2
: the buyers that attach a lower weight to their partner's loyalty perform
poorer, especially in lower-dierentiation segments. The results in experiment
11 are less clear, because of interference with the suppliers' also using dierent
strategies. In experiment 12, not all buyers end up at the performance level
indicated by their position on the market (see Figure 3). Because dierent
suppliers attach dierent weights to loyalty, some buyers manage to form last-
ing relations with relatively attractive suppliers on that account, rather than
on account of the buyers being relatively attractive economically in return.
9
The most interesting and, of course, least clear-cut outcomes are those where
the buyers are all the same, while suppliers dier in their eciency: which
buyers end up with most attractive suppliers? The nal 4 experiments show
these results. In experiment 13 (Figure 4), prots for the three groups of





1 + 1 + 0:5
;
which yields prots of 0.6, 0.8 and 1 when e
s
= 0, 0.5 and 1, respectively. The
three buyers that start out with the most ecient supplier happen|in this
particular run of the experiment|to subsequently lose them to some of their
more fortunate competitors. This is because requesting a supplier increases
that supplier's interpretation of the requesting buyer's loyalty, so that the
requesting buyer has an advantage over other buyers at the contract renewal
moment (contrary to TCE's `fundamental transformation' where the current
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Figure 4: Buyers' prot in experiment 13.
In experiment 14, the buyers that end up at the highest performance level are
the ones that attach the lowest weight to loyalty (see Figure 5). Furthermore,
there are indications of a non-linear eect, in that the buyers with 
2
= 0
perform the best, while the buyers with 
2
= 1 also seem to perform better
than the buyers with 
2
= 0:5.
The results from experiments 15 and 16 are less clear; in general, the results
should be analyzed more carefully. Furthermore, many of these results are
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Figure 5: Buyers' prot in experiment 14.
runs of the various experiments. The initial results presented here, however,
already show a multitude of interesting phenomena.
In some of the experiments presented above, some of the agents performed
very poorly, due to unsuccessful strategies hard-wired in them, while real-
world agents would rather change such apparently unproductive behavior.
Therefore, the remainder of this section presents some preliminary results
with adaptive agents that use the setup that was described at the end of
section 2. There were only 4 experimental circumstances, namely the dierent
combinations of equal vs. varying levels of dierentiation and eciency. The
results in terms of adaptation are shown as the development of the weighted
average value of the importance of prot, 
1
, i.e. the sum of all possible values
(0, 0.5 and 1) multiplied with their weights. The lower this weighted average,
the higher the strength that the value 
1
= 0 has, because that value does not
increase the average.
In all the experiments, the buyers normalized performance was as expected:
inuenced mostly by the supplier's eciency and only slightly by their own
contribution, as in the rst series of experiments. In all the experiments, also,
the evolution of the weighted average 
1
showed a decreasing importance of
prot relative to loyalty over time (see Figure 6 for these results in the rst
experiment). The buyers learn that a lower value for 
1
leads to the best
performance.
To illustrate further, Figure 7 shows the results for one of the most successful
buyers in experiment 2. The thick black line is normalized performance, the
thick grey line is the weighted average 
1
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Figure 6: Weighted average 
1
in experiment 1.
line is the actual value for 
1
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Figure 7: Buyer 9 in experiment 2.
4 Conclusions
According to the results, adaptive agents decrease the weight of protability in
their evaluation of a relationship, with a corresponding increase of the weight
they attach to the partner's loyalty. This is an important result, because,
although partners are evaluated on the basis of both protability and loyalty,
adaptation takes place only on the basis of prot. Furthermore, in the current
version of the model, only suppliers can switch and it is assumed that the agent
that breaks the relation carries the cost of switching, i.e. compensating the
supplier for scrapping specic assets. Thus, there is no need for the buyer to
value loyalty in order to prevent switching costs. The reason why a supplier's
loyalty matters to a buyer is only that it indicates to what extent potential
12
prot will be realized. A loyal supplier means continued supply and hence no
loss due to discontinuity.
Dierent heights and distributions of switching costs may yield dierent
results for the prot generating potential of loyalty. This will be investigated
in further research. Another point is that while agents attach dierent weights
to their partners' loyalty, there is no variation in the loyalty they exhibit: this is
determined in the same way for all by the short term protability of disloyalty.
Further work will therefore allow for variation in the inclination towards loyal
behavior and relate it to the weight attached to partners' loyalty.
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